Pavel Matsukevich
December 2022
For a long time, Belarus has been perceived as a country at a geopolitical crossroads: it could go in either direction or even attempt to stay put by manipulating more powerful global players. But this image has rarely corresponded to reality, and now the notion of a Belarus ‘at the crossroads’ is more outdated than ever: since February 24, 2022, the regime in Minsk has arrived at a dead end. In order to get back on track, the country needs to overhaul its image to that of a new, open Belarus.
what to do when a pivot to the west means a ‘special operation’: how Belarusian foreign policy can break the deadlock
Ryhor Astapenia
Pavel Matsukevich
Pavel Matsukevich is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for New Ideas. He is an alumnus of the Faculty of International Relations at Belarusian State University. Over the course of 15 years, he has held various roles within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the position of Chargé d'Affaires of Belarus in Switzerland.
Ryhor Astapenia
Ryhor Astapenia is the Founder of the Center for New Ideas and serves as the director of the Belarus Initiative at Chatham House. He obtained his PhD from the University of Warsaw.
Belarus’s participation in Russia’s aggression, along with the mass violations of human rights within the country, have uprooted the foundations of Belarus’s foreign policy. Whereas the Lukashenka regime was once able to pivot tactically in its international relations to ensure its own survival, in 2020–2022 it completely changed course.
Despite its geographical position, Belarus is losing its status as a transit country, and there is less and less demand for its logistical infrastructure. The EU has decided against financing infrastructure projects that connect it with Belarus (and Russia).
Meanwhile, China is opening alterative routs for delivering its goods to Europe that bypass Belarus. The transit of Chinese goods to the EU by rail through the country decreased by 25.7% in the first half of 2022. Transit in the opposite direction (from Europe) decreased by 35%.
An important factor that limits Belarus’s economic opportunities is its loss of access to transit through the Baltic countries and Ukraine. Enterprises must now rely on Russian ports and rail, which leaves Belarus less room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis Russia and significantly increases transportation costs.
Given this loss of geographic advantages, the official government’s ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy—which it claims to adhere to even now—is no longer feasible, as Belarus is now on hostile terms with four out of its five neighbors. A country that once claimed to be a ‘donor of regional security’ is now perceived as a threat.
Belarus’s economic model of taking advantage of resources from Russia and the West simultaneously is in shambles. In place of precious Western technologies, loans, and investments, it now has sanctions, which limits its potential to export to third countries.
The most economically active strata of Belarusian society has largely been forced to leave the county, and the longer Belarus remains in its current state, the higher the chances that those who left between 2020 and 2022 will not return. In practice, this translates to a loss of several hundred thousand people, often highly qualified specialists who are plugged into the international market and invested in a version of Belarus that is open to the world.
The state of external confrontation Belarus is involved in is widely unpopular. Regardless of the reason—be it pragmatism, naiveté, friendliness, indifference, or something else—the fact remains that the majority of Belarusians don’t see themselves as a warlike people who hate some other country. And no single geopolitical choice dominates public opinion in Belarusian society anyway.
Despite its geographical position, Belarus is losing its status as a transit country, and there is less and less demand for its logistical infrastructure. The EU has decided against financing infrastructure projects that connect it with Belarus (and Russia).
Meanwhile, China is opening alterative routs for delivering its goods to Europe that bypass Belarus. The transit of Chinese goods to the EU by rail through the country decreased by 25.7% in the first half of 2022. Transit in the opposite direction (from Europe) decreased by 35%.
An important factor that limits Belarus’s economic opportunities is its loss of access to transit through the Baltic countries and Ukraine. Enterprises must now rely on Russian ports and rail, which leaves Belarus less room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis Russia and significantly increases transportation costs.
Given this loss of geographic advantages, the official government’s ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy—which it claims to adhere to even now—is no longer feasible, as Belarus is now on hostile terms with four out of its five neighbors. A country that once claimed to be a ‘donor of regional security’ is now perceived as a threat.
Belarus’s economic model of taking advantage of resources from Russia and the West simultaneously is in shambles. In place of precious Western technologies, loans, and investments, it now has sanctions, which limits its potential to export to third countries.
The most economically active strata of Belarusian society has largely been forced to leave the county, and the longer Belarus remains in its current state, the higher the chances that those who left between 2020 and 2022 will not return. In practice, this translates to a loss of several hundred thousand people, often highly qualified specialists who are plugged into the international market and invested in a version of Belarus that is open to the world.
The state of external confrontation Belarus is involved in is widely unpopular. Regardless of the reason—be it pragmatism, naiveté, friendliness, indifference, or something else—the fact remains that the majority of Belarusians don’t see themselves as a warlike people who hate some other country. And no single geopolitical choice dominates public opinion in Belarusian society anyway.
Belarus’s participation in Russia’s aggression, along with the mass violations of human rights within the country, have uprooted the foundations of Belarus’s foreign policy. Whereas the Lukashenka regime was once able to pivot tactically in its international relations to ensure its own survival, in 2020–2022 it completely changed course.
Despite its geographical position, Belarus is losing its status as a transit country, and there is less and less demand for its logistical infrastructure. The EU has decided against financing infrastructure projects that connect it with Belarus (and Russia).
Meanwhile, China is opening alterative routs for delivering its goods to Europe that bypass Belarus. The transit of Chinese goods to the EU by rail through the country decreased by 25.7% in the first half of 2022. Transit in the opposite direction (from Europe) decreased by 35%.
An important factor that limits Belarus’s economic opportunities is its loss of access to transit through the Baltic countries and Ukraine. Enterprises must now rely on Russian ports and rail, which leaves Belarus less room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis Russia and significantly increases transportation costs.
Given this loss of geographic advantages, the official government’s ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy—which it claims to adhere to even now—is no longer feasible, as Belarus is now on hostile terms with four out of its five neighbors. A country that once claimed to be a ‘donor of regional security’ is now perceived as a threat.
Belarus’s economic model of taking advantage of resources from Russia and the West simultaneously is in shambles. In place of precious Western technologies, loans, and investments, it now has sanctions, which limits its potential to export to third countries.
The most economically active strata of Belarusian society has largely been forced to leave the county, and the longer Belarus remains in its current state, the higher the chances that those who left between 2020 and 2022 will not return. In practice, this translates to a loss of several hundred thousand people, often highly qualified specialists who are plugged into the international market and invested in a version of Belarus that is open to the world.
The state of external confrontation Belarus is involved in is widely unpopular. Regardless of the reason—be it pragmatism, naiveté, friendliness, indifference, or something else—the fact remains that the majority of Belarusians don’t see themselves as a warlike people who hate some other country. And no single geopolitical choice dominates public opinion in Belarusian society anyway.
Despite its geographical position, Belarus is losing its status as a transit country, and there is less and less demand for its logistical infrastructure. The EU has decided against financing infrastructure projects that connect it with Belarus (and Russia).
Meanwhile, China is opening alterative routs for delivering its goods to Europe that bypass Belarus. The transit of Chinese goods to the EU by rail through the country decreased by 25.7% in the first half of 2022. Transit in the opposite direction (from Europe) decreased by 35%.
An important factor that limits Belarus’s economic opportunities is its loss of access to transit through the Baltic countries and Ukraine. Enterprises must now rely on Russian ports and rail, which leaves Belarus less room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis Russia and significantly increases transportation costs.
Given this loss of geographic advantages, the official government’s ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy—which it claims to adhere to even now—is no longer feasible, as Belarus is now on hostile terms with four out of its five neighbors. A country that once claimed to be a ‘donor of regional security’ is now perceived as a threat.
Belarus’s economic model of taking advantage of resources from Russia and the West simultaneously is in shambles. In place of precious Western technologies, loans, and investments, it now has sanctions, which limits its potential to export to third countries.
The most economically active strata of Belarusian society has largely been forced to leave the county, and the longer Belarus remains in its current state, the higher the chances that those who left between 2020 and 2022 will not return. In practice, this translates to a loss of several hundred thousand people, often highly qualified specialists who are plugged into the international market and invested in a version of Belarus that is open to the world.
The state of external confrontation Belarus is involved in is widely unpopular. Regardless of the reason—be it pragmatism, naiveté, friendliness, indifference, or something else—the fact remains that the majority of Belarusians don’t see themselves as a warlike people who hate some other country. And no single geopolitical choice dominates public opinion in Belarusian society anyway.
Belarus’s participation in Russia’s aggression, along with the mass violations of human rights within the country, have uprooted the foundations of Belarus’s foreign policy. Whereas the Lukashenka regime was once able to pivot tactically in its international relations to ensure its own survival, in 2020–2022 it completely changed course.
Despite its geographical position, Belarus is losing its status as a transit country, and there is less and less demand for its logistical infrastructure. The EU has decided against financing infrastructure projects that connect it with Belarus (and Russia).
Meanwhile, China is opening alterative routs for delivering its goods to Europe that bypass Belarus. The transit of Chinese goods to the EU by rail through the country decreased by 25.7% in the first half of 2022. Transit in the opposite direction (from Europe) decreased by 35%.
An important factor that limits Belarus’s economic opportunities is its loss of access to transit through the Baltic countries and Ukraine. Enterprises must now rely on Russian ports and rail, which leaves Belarus less room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis Russia and significantly increases transportation costs.
Given this loss of geographic advantages, the official government’s ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy—which it claims to adhere to even now—is no longer feasible, as Belarus is now on hostile terms with four out of its five neighbors. A country that once claimed to be a ‘donor of regional security’ is now perceived as a threat.
Belarus’s economic model of taking advantage of resources from Russia and the West simultaneously is in shambles. In place of precious Western technologies, loans, and investments, it now has sanctions, which limits its potential to export to third countries.
The most economically active strata of Belarusian society has largely been forced to leave the county, and the longer Belarus remains in its current state, the higher the chances that those who left between 2020 and 2022 will not return. In practice, this translates to a loss of several hundred thousand people, often highly qualified specialists who are plugged into the international market and invested in a version of Belarus that is open to the world.
The state of external confrontation Belarus is involved in is widely unpopular. Regardless of the reason—be it pragmatism, naiveté, friendliness, indifference, or something else—the fact remains that the majority of Belarusians don’t see themselves as a warlike people who hate some other country. And no single geopolitical choice dominates public opinion in Belarusian society anyway.
Despite its geographical position, Belarus is losing its status as a transit country, and there is less and less demand for its logistical infrastructure. The EU has decided against financing infrastructure projects that connect it with Belarus (and Russia).
Meanwhile, China is opening alterative routs for delivering its goods to Europe that bypass Belarus. The transit of Chinese goods to the EU by rail through the country decreased by 25.7% in the first half of 2022. Transit in the opposite direction (from Europe) decreased by 35%.
An important factor that limits Belarus’s economic opportunities is its loss of access to transit through the Baltic countries and Ukraine. Enterprises must now rely on Russian ports and rail, which leaves Belarus less room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis Russia and significantly increases transportation costs.
Given this loss of geographic advantages, the official government’s ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy—which it claims to adhere to even now—is no longer feasible, as Belarus is now on hostile terms with four out of its five neighbors. A country that once claimed to be a ‘donor of regional security’ is now perceived as a threat.
Belarus’s economic model of taking advantage of resources from Russia and the West simultaneously is in shambles. In place of precious Western technologies, loans, and investments, it now has sanctions, which limits its potential to export to third countries.
The most economically active strata of Belarusian society has largely been forced to leave the county, and the longer Belarus remains in its current state, the higher the chances that those who left between 2020 and 2022 will not return. In practice, this translates to a loss of several hundred thousand people, often highly qualified specialists who are plugged into the international market and invested in a version of Belarus that is open to the world.
The state of external confrontation Belarus is involved in is widely unpopular. Regardless of the reason—be it pragmatism, naiveté, friendliness, indifference, or something else—the fact remains that the majority of Belarusians don’t see themselves as a warlike people who hate some other country. And no single geopolitical choice dominates public opinion in Belarusian society anyway.
What the foreign policy of an ‘open Belarus’ might look like
No one knows how the war will end, what will become of Belarus as a result, or what condition the regime will be in once the dust settles. But beyond the horizon, Belarus will face further crossroads that will determine the course of its history.
If the country is to shed off its status as an outcast and create an effective foreign policy, it will need to do away with Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his repressions. It will also need to deal with the country’s stigma as a co-aggressor. Fortunately, even if Lukashenka agrees to hand over power to a hand-picked successor, this would look like progress, potentially opening up new possibilities for dialogue.
Many countries find it politically expedient—if not necessarily economically beneficial—to limit their ties with Belarus. This attitude could persist even after democratisation if the West does not perceive positive changes to be long-term. In order to reverse this attitude, Lukashenka’s successor would need to overhaul Belarus’s image. If the forces that come to power are democratic, it would be easier for the country to acquire a new image—of what we call an ‘open Belarus’ (and we can already start creating this image now).
This new image must be reinforced by action in the economic and military-political spheres that outweighs the inertia caused by the current ‘have-nothing-to-do-with Minsk’ approach.
This would mean radically simplifying economic cooperation and intensifying security ties. The former would involve increasing the appeal of doing business in Belarus, making the country more open to foreigners, developing infrastructure, cooperating with international financial institutions and donors, and improving rule of law and political stability. In the security sphere, Belarus would need to revisit its military partnership with Russia in order to strive for neutrality, which would help it restore a balanced relationship with both Western and Eastern countries.
The notion of a balanced foreign policy is hardly new in Belarus, and options are limited, if they even exist at all. If Belarus keeps getting closer to Russia, it will sooner or later be absorbed, but if it pivots to the West, it risks a ‘special de-nazification operation’ from the Kremlin. In this sense, striving for neutrality would be a pragmatic step towards a safe way out of the current impasse.
If the country is to shed off its status as an outcast and create an effective foreign policy, it will need to do away with Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his repressions. It will also need to deal with the country’s stigma as a co-aggressor. Fortunately, even if Lukashenka agrees to hand over power to a hand-picked successor, this would look like progress, potentially opening up new possibilities for dialogue.
Many countries find it politically expedient—if not necessarily economically beneficial—to limit their ties with Belarus. This attitude could persist even after democratisation if the West does not perceive positive changes to be long-term. In order to reverse this attitude, Lukashenka’s successor would need to overhaul Belarus’s image. If the forces that come to power are democratic, it would be easier for the country to acquire a new image—of what we call an ‘open Belarus’ (and we can already start creating this image now).
This new image must be reinforced by action in the economic and military-political spheres that outweighs the inertia caused by the current ‘have-nothing-to-do-with Minsk’ approach.
This would mean radically simplifying economic cooperation and intensifying security ties. The former would involve increasing the appeal of doing business in Belarus, making the country more open to foreigners, developing infrastructure, cooperating with international financial institutions and donors, and improving rule of law and political stability. In the security sphere, Belarus would need to revisit its military partnership with Russia in order to strive for neutrality, which would help it restore a balanced relationship with both Western and Eastern countries.
The notion of a balanced foreign policy is hardly new in Belarus, and options are limited, if they even exist at all. If Belarus keeps getting closer to Russia, it will sooner or later be absorbed, but if it pivots to the West, it risks a ‘special de-nazification operation’ from the Kremlin. In this sense, striving for neutrality would be a pragmatic step towards a safe way out of the current impasse.
What the foreign policy of an ‘open Belarus’ might look like
No one knows how the war will end, what will become of Belarus as a result, or what condition the regime will be in once the dust settles. But beyond the horizon, Belarus will face further crossroads that will determine the course of its history.
If the country is to shed off its status as an outcast and create an effective foreign policy, it will need to do away with Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his repressions. It will also need to deal with the country’s stigma as a co-aggressor. Fortunately, even if Lukashenka agrees to hand over power to a hand-picked successor, this would look like progress, potentially opening up new possibilities for dialogue.
Many countries find it politically expedient—if not necessarily economically beneficial—to limit their ties with Belarus. This attitude could persist even after democratisation if the West does not perceive positive changes to be long-term. In order to reverse this attitude, Lukashenka’s successor would need to overhaul Belarus’s image. If the forces that come to power are democratic, it would be easier for the country to acquire a new image—of what we call an ‘open Belarus’ (and we can already start creating this image now).
This new image must be reinforced by action in the economic and military-political spheres that outweighs the inertia caused by the current ‘have-nothing-to-do-with Minsk’ approach.
This would mean radically simplifying economic cooperation and intensifying security ties. The former would involve increasing the appeal of doing business in Belarus, making the country more open to foreigners, developing infrastructure, cooperating with international financial institutions and donors, and improving rule of law and political stability. In the security sphere, Belarus would need to revisit its military partnership with Russia in order to strive for neutrality, which would help it restore a balanced relationship with both Western and Eastern countries.
The notion of a balanced foreign policy is hardly new in Belarus, and options are limited, if they even exist at all. If Belarus keeps getting closer to Russia, it will sooner or later be absorbed, but if it pivots to the West, it risks a ‘special de-nazification operation’ from the Kremlin. In this sense, striving for neutrality would be a pragmatic step towards a safe way out of the current impasse.
If the country is to shed off its status as an outcast and create an effective foreign policy, it will need to do away with Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his repressions. It will also need to deal with the country’s stigma as a co-aggressor. Fortunately, even if Lukashenka agrees to hand over power to a hand-picked successor, this would look like progress, potentially opening up new possibilities for dialogue.
Many countries find it politically expedient—if not necessarily economically beneficial—to limit their ties with Belarus. This attitude could persist even after democratisation if the West does not perceive positive changes to be long-term. In order to reverse this attitude, Lukashenka’s successor would need to overhaul Belarus’s image. If the forces that come to power are democratic, it would be easier for the country to acquire a new image—of what we call an ‘open Belarus’ (and we can already start creating this image now).
This new image must be reinforced by action in the economic and military-political spheres that outweighs the inertia caused by the current ‘have-nothing-to-do-with Minsk’ approach.
This would mean radically simplifying economic cooperation and intensifying security ties. The former would involve increasing the appeal of doing business in Belarus, making the country more open to foreigners, developing infrastructure, cooperating with international financial institutions and donors, and improving rule of law and political stability. In the security sphere, Belarus would need to revisit its military partnership with Russia in order to strive for neutrality, which would help it restore a balanced relationship with both Western and Eastern countries.
The notion of a balanced foreign policy is hardly new in Belarus, and options are limited, if they even exist at all. If Belarus keeps getting closer to Russia, it will sooner or later be absorbed, but if it pivots to the West, it risks a ‘special de-nazification operation’ from the Kremlin. In this sense, striving for neutrality would be a pragmatic step towards a safe way out of the current impasse.
What the foreign policy of an ‘open Belarus’ might look like
No one knows how the war will end, what will become of Belarus as a result, or what condition the regime will be in once the dust settles. But beyond the horizon, Belarus will face further crossroads that will determine the course of its history.
If the country is to shed off its status as an outcast and create an effective foreign policy, it will need to do away with Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his repressions. It will also need to deal with the country’s stigma as a co-aggressor. Fortunately, even if Lukashenka agrees to hand over power to a hand-picked successor, this would look like progress, potentially opening up new possibilities for dialogue.
Many countries find it politically expedient—if not necessarily economically beneficial—to limit their ties with Belarus. This attitude could persist even after democratisation if the West does not perceive positive changes to be long-term. In order to reverse this attitude, Lukashenka’s successor would need to overhaul Belarus’s image. If the forces that come to power are democratic, it would be easier for the country to acquire a new image—of what we call an ‘open Belarus’ (and we can already start creating this image now).
This new image must be reinforced by action in the economic and military-political spheres that outweighs the inertia caused by the current ‘have-nothing-to-do-with Minsk’ approach.
This would mean radically simplifying economic cooperation and intensifying security ties. The former would involve increasing the appeal of doing business in Belarus, making the country more open to foreigners, developing infrastructure, cooperating with international financial institutions and donors, and improving rule of law and political stability. In the security sphere, Belarus would need to revisit its military partnership with Russia in order to strive for neutrality, which would help it restore a balanced relationship with both Western and Eastern countries.
The notion of a balanced foreign policy is hardly new in Belarus, and options are limited, if they even exist at all. If Belarus keeps getting closer to Russia, it will sooner or later be absorbed, but if it pivots to the West, it risks a ‘special de-nazification operation’ from the Kremlin. In this sense, striving for neutrality would be a pragmatic step towards a safe way out of the current impasse.
If the country is to shed off its status as an outcast and create an effective foreign policy, it will need to do away with Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his repressions. It will also need to deal with the country’s stigma as a co-aggressor. Fortunately, even if Lukashenka agrees to hand over power to a hand-picked successor, this would look like progress, potentially opening up new possibilities for dialogue.
Many countries find it politically expedient—if not necessarily economically beneficial—to limit their ties with Belarus. This attitude could persist even after democratisation if the West does not perceive positive changes to be long-term. In order to reverse this attitude, Lukashenka’s successor would need to overhaul Belarus’s image. If the forces that come to power are democratic, it would be easier for the country to acquire a new image—of what we call an ‘open Belarus’ (and we can already start creating this image now).
This new image must be reinforced by action in the economic and military-political spheres that outweighs the inertia caused by the current ‘have-nothing-to-do-with Minsk’ approach.
This would mean radically simplifying economic cooperation and intensifying security ties. The former would involve increasing the appeal of doing business in Belarus, making the country more open to foreigners, developing infrastructure, cooperating with international financial institutions and donors, and improving rule of law and political stability. In the security sphere, Belarus would need to revisit its military partnership with Russia in order to strive for neutrality, which would help it restore a balanced relationship with both Western and Eastern countries.
The notion of a balanced foreign policy is hardly new in Belarus, and options are limited, if they even exist at all. If Belarus keeps getting closer to Russia, it will sooner or later be absorbed, but if it pivots to the West, it risks a ‘special de-nazification operation’ from the Kremlin. In this sense, striving for neutrality would be a pragmatic step towards a safe way out of the current impasse.
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