How to Prevent the Extinction of the Belarusian People

how to prevent the extinction of the Belarusian people

Lev Lvovskiy

January 2023

The Belarusian population is shrinking and ageing. If current patterns persist, by the end of the century the country’s population will halve. Why is this happening, how does depopulation threaten us, and how can we cope with it?

Lev Lvovskiy

Lev Lvovskiy is the Academic Director of the Center for Economic Research BEROC and holds a PhD in economics from the University of Iowa, USA.

A bit of theory

Economics is a grey, soulless science that considers various aspects of human existance in terms of costs and benefits. Childhood and parenthood are no exception. Economists see children as a special class of ‘goods’ that satisfy needs without profiting parents materially. But unlike normal goods, children represent two types of cost: monetary (buying food, pampers, and clothes) and time (parenthood can’t be rushed). Furthermore, children impose long-term obligations on adults, who need to factor in both types of expense far into the future.

From these simple definitions, we can deduce three situations that could cause women and their partners to have fewer children in the future:

when they are unable to pay the monetary price of parenthood—or simply put, when they’re poor;

when they are burdened by the time cost. For example, a woman IT worker’s average day could be worth hundreds of dollars, and a year-long career break could cost her tens of thousands; in such cases, a child costs its own weight in gold, and having someone by her side to extend the proverbial ‘glass of water in old age’ would cost her much more than an apartment in an elite district of Minsk;

when the current salaries of would-be parents theoretically allow them to have a child, but uncertainty about the future makes them hesitant to take this step.

For the country’s population to remain constant, without taking into account migration, every woman would need to give birth to an average of 2.1 children. The total fertility rate (TFR) has never been so high in the history of modern Belarus.

A bit of theory

Economics is a grey, soulless science that considers various aspects of human existance in terms of costs and benefits. Childhood and parenthood are no exception. Economists see children as a special class of ‘goods’ that satisfy needs without profiting parents materially. But unlike normal goods, children represent two types of cost: monetary (buying food, pampers, and clothes) and time (parenthood can’t be rushed). Furthermore, children impose long-term obligations on adults, who need to factor in both types of expense far into the future.

From these simple definitions, we can deduce three situations that could cause women and their partners to have fewer children in the future:

when they are unable to pay the monetary price of parenthood—or simply put, when they’re poor;

when they are burdened by the time cost. For example, a woman IT worker’s average day could be worth hundreds of dollars, and a year-long career break could cost her tens of thousands; in such cases, a child costs its own weight in gold, and having someone by her side to extend the proverbial ‘glass of water in old age’ would cost her much more than an apartment in an elite district of Minsk;

when the current salaries of would-be parents theoretically allow them to have a child, but uncertainty about the future makes them hesitant to take this step.

For the country’s population to remain constant, without taking into account migration, every woman would need to give birth to an average of 2.1 children. The total fertility rate (TFR) has never been so high in the history of modern Belarus.

A bit of theory

Economics is a grey, soulless science that considers various aspects of human existance in terms of costs and benefits. Childhood and parenthood are no exception. Economists see children as a special class of ‘goods’ that satisfy needs without profiting parents materially. But unlike normal goods, children represent two types of cost: monetary (buying food, pampers, and clothes) and time (parenthood can’t be rushed). Furthermore, children impose long-term obligations on adults, who need to factor in both types of expense far into the future.

From these simple definitions, we can deduce three situations that could cause women and their partners to have fewer children in the future:

when they are unable to pay the monetary price of parenthood—or simply put, when they’re poor;

when they are burdened by the time cost. For example, a woman IT worker’s average day could be worth hundreds of dollars, and a year-long career break could cost her tens of thousands; in such cases, a child costs its own weight in gold, and having someone by her side to extend the proverbial ‘glass of water in old age’ would cost her much more than an apartment in an elite district of Minsk;

when the current salaries of would-be parents theoretically allow them to have a child, but uncertainty about the future makes them hesitant to take this step.

For the country’s population to remain constant, without taking into account migration, every woman would need to give birth to an average of 2.1 children. The total fertility rate (TFR) has never been so high in the history of modern Belarus.

A demographic history of Belarus

In the 1990s, due to economic problems and general uncertainty, the TFR declined rapidly, eventually reaching a low of 1.25. As quality of life improved, the TRF gradually began to recover. Several measures that generously rewarded Belarusians for having children played a key role in this.

A new peak in the country’s birth rate occurred in 2016, when the TFR reached 1.73 children per woman. However, demographers started to notice another decline as early as 2017: whereas in the ‘90s women were deciding against motherhood because of poverty, the current decline can be attributed to the time cost.

A demographic history of Belarus

In the 1990s, due to economic problems and general uncertainty, the TFR declined rapidly, eventually reaching a low of 1.25. As quality of life improved, the TRF gradually began to recover. Several measures that generously rewarded Belarusians for having children played a key role in this.

A new peak in the country’s birth rate occurred in 2016, when the TFR reached 1.73 children per woman. However, demographers started to notice another decline as early as 2017: whereas in the ‘90s women were deciding against motherhood because of poverty, the current decline can be attributed to the time cost.

A demographic history of Belarus

In the 1990s, due to economic problems and general uncertainty, the TFR declined rapidly, eventually reaching a low of 1.25. As quality of life improved, the TRF gradually began to recover. Several measures that generously rewarded Belarusians for having children played a key role in this.

A new peak in the country’s birth rate occurred in 2016, when the TFR reached 1.73 children per woman. However, demographers started to notice another decline as early as 2017: whereas in the ‘90s women were deciding against motherhood because of poverty, the current decline can be attributed to the time cost.

By 2017, the government had got carried away handing out benefits, almost completely ignoring the needs of modern Belarusians, who need to be compensated for the time spent on motherhood rather than the cost of diapers. Ineffective support measures led the birth rate to decline to 1.38 children per women by 2019.

Because of the government’s wishes to hide the true COVID-19 mortality rate, demographic data has since been classified, so we do not know how the TFR has changed in the past two years. But we can assume that this coefficient has continued to decline: no new measures have been taken to increase the birth rate since then, and it’s unlikely that the COVID-19 epidemic, the political crisis, the war between Belarus’s neighbours, or the economic recession have imbued Belarusians with more confidence about the future.

The Belarusian extinction

The demographic tree of Belarus reveals two more important demographic problems our country faces.

The Belarusian extinction

The demographic tree of Belarus reveals two more important demographic problems our country faces.

The Belarusian extinction

The demographic tree of Belarus reveals two more important demographic problems our country faces.

In addition to the declining average birth rate, population waves have been haunting the country since World War II: This phenomenon occurs when increased mortality in one generation leads to fewer children being born; the resulting small cohort begins to repeat like a ripple every 20 years. As of now, the reproductive window is closing (for the relatively large population of women who were born right before the fall of the USSR most Belarusian women give birth between 18 and 35). It is giving way to the relatively small population of women who were born in the mid ‘90s or the early 2000s.

Another anomaly of Belarus that is evident on the demographic tree is the heightened male mortality. It is true that for genetic and behavioural reasons, women live longer than men in almost all countries, but Belarus is the absolute leader in this indicator. In our country, the average woman outlives the average man by more than 10 years, compared to a global average of 4.5 years.

What are the implications of a declining population?

By itself, population decline does not necessarily lead to economic problems. The quality of life of individual people can improve even despite a decrease in total GDP. Nevertheless, abrupt demographic changes and an ageing population, by changing the age structure of society, can be cataclysmic for the economy.

If current trends continue, the ratio of pensioners to people of working age in Belarus will grow more than a time and a half by mid-century. This has serious implications for the current pension system, and domestic demand will shift towards goods and services needed by the elderly, which will affect the potential of sectors where the Belarusian economy can be competitive.

If the birth and death rates of 2019 hold, then by the end of the century the population of Belarus could shrink by half, amounting to just over four million people. The graph below presents the ‘baseline scenario assuming the return of emigrants’; it does not take into account the people who have left Belarus over the last three years. ‘The baseline scenario without the return of emigrants’ assumes that trends in fertility and mortality will not change even after the 200,000 person migration outflow that occurred between 2020 and 2022. If we manage to return to the recent local maximum TFR of 1.73 children per woman and nullify the population loss caused by emigration since 2019, then it will be possible to significantly slow population shrinkage, and by 2100 more than 6 million people will reside in the country.

What are the implications of a declining population?

By itself, population decline does not necessarily lead to economic problems. The quality of life of individual people can improve even despite a decrease in total GDP. Nevertheless, abrupt demographic changes and an ageing population, by changing the age structure of society, can be cataclysmic for the economy.

If current trends continue, the ratio of pensioners to people of working age in Belarus will grow more than a time and a half by mid-century. This has serious implications for the current pension system, and domestic demand will shift towards goods and services needed by the elderly, which will affect the potential of sectors where the Belarusian economy can be competitive.

If the birth and death rates of 2019 hold, then by the end of the century the population of Belarus could shrink by half, amounting to just over four million people. The graph below presents the ‘baseline scenario assuming the return of emigrants’; it does not take into account the people who have left Belarus over the last three years. ‘The baseline scenario without the return of emigrants’ assumes that trends in fertility and mortality will not change even after the 200,000 person migration outflow that occurred between 2020 and 2022. If we manage to return to the recent local maximum TFR of 1.73 children per woman and nullify the population loss caused by emigration since 2019, then it will be possible to significantly slow population shrinkage, and by 2100 more than 6 million people will reside in the country.

What are the implications of a declining population?

By itself, population decline does not necessarily lead to economic problems. The quality of life of individual people can improve even despite a decrease in total GDP. Nevertheless, abrupt demographic changes and an ageing population, by changing the age structure of society, can be cataclysmic for the economy.

If current trends continue, the ratio of pensioners to people of working age in Belarus will grow more than a time and a half by mid-century. This has serious implications for the current pension system, and domestic demand will shift towards goods and services needed by the elderly, which will affect the potential of sectors where the Belarusian economy can be competitive.

If the birth and death rates of 2019 hold, then by the end of the century the population of Belarus could shrink by half, amounting to just over four million people. The graph below presents the ‘baseline scenario assuming the return of emigrants’; it does not take into account the people who have left Belarus over the last three years. ‘The baseline scenario without the return of emigrants’ assumes that trends in fertility and mortality will not change even after the 200,000 person migration outflow that occurred between 2020 and 2022. If we manage to return to the recent local maximum TFR of 1.73 children per woman and nullify the population loss caused by emigration since 2019, then it will be possible to significantly slow population shrinkage, and by 2100 more than 6 million people will reside in the country.

Reversing demographic trends is a very difficult task that will need to be tackled on several different fronts. This means fighting for every potential citizen of Belarus.

What can be done?

The most important thing is not to panic. Most developed countries are facing the same problem: natural ageing and population decline are occurring throughout all of Europe. To some extent, this is a normal process: a decline in the birth rate is a side effect of improved quality of life, particularly for women. Nevertheless, Belarus and Belarusians ought to take several important steps in order to mitigate population loss.

First, the country should support childbearing. Existing measures to support motherhood in Belarus focus on the poor; however, little attention is devoted to the problems of modern working women, for whom the main obstacle to raising a family is their career. Such Belarusians and their partners are not poor in money terms—they just don’t have enough time. Therefore, their time is what ought to be subsidised.

To this end, the state could make efforts to build a convenient daycare system where children can be sent at earlier ages. It could also introduce legislation that offers more flexible employment terms for young parents, promote paternal leave, and invest in infrastructure that would be more conducive to combining parenthood and an active lifestyle.

Another thing Belarus in particular should consider is reducing the length of maternity leave. After the fall of the USSR, our country introduced a three-year maternity leave, which is currently the longest paid maternity leave in the world. Formally, no one is forcing mothers to sit at home with the kid this whole time. But in practice, most women are pressured into taking all three years. There are two main reasons for this:

Such legislation creates confusion, as it implies that this three-year period is somehow vital for the child’s development. And women who go back to work after only a year of maternity leave can sometimes face social stigma for being ‘bad mothers.’ However, there is no scientific evidence for a three-year maternity leave; it may seem hard to believe, but this number is totally made up. It is not clear whether children whose mothers returned from maternity leave before the three allotted years are any different from kids whose mothers took a full leave.

Long-term maternity leave creates a self-perpetuating cycle: since women choose to stay by their kids’ side until they turn three, the government does not invest in daycare or preschools, meaning that other women have no choice but to follow the majority.

In addition to supporting parenthood, there is one more effective way to increase the population: attracting migrants to the country. This brings us to our second point.

It is worth noting that Belarus has never taken any measures to counteract emigration or increase immigration at the government level. Since 2020, according to BEROC estimates (the research is soon to be published), around 150,000–250,000 people have left the country. Although there has always been a steady stream of emigration, before it was much smaller.

Meanwhile, if a foreigner wishes to move to Belarus, they are met with numerous bureaucratic obstacles, which require considerable efforts to overcome. The only exception here is the High Tech Park, which has managed to negotiate simplified conditions for its foreign residents.

However, it is safe to assume that the lack of migrants on the streets of Belarusian cities is not only due to the government’s best efforts to restrict everything. There is another reason, which is rarely spoken about in society: Belarusians are not a tolerant people, even if they sincerely love to call themselves so. According to available opinion polls, our fellow citizens are wary of different cultures.

What can be done?

The most important thing is not to panic. Most developed countries are facing the same problem: natural ageing and population decline are occurring throughout all of Europe. To some extent, this is a normal process: a decline in the birth rate is a side effect of improved quality of life, particularly for women. Nevertheless, Belarus and Belarusians ought to take several important steps in order to mitigate population loss.

First, the country should support childbearing. Existing measures to support motherhood in Belarus focus on the poor; however, little attention is devoted to the problems of modern working women, for whom the main obstacle to raising a family is their career. Such Belarusians and their partners are not poor in money terms—they just don’t have enough time. Therefore, their time is what ought to be subsidised.

To this end, the state could make efforts to build a convenient daycare system where children can be sent at earlier ages. It could also introduce legislation that offers more flexible employment terms for young parents, promote paternal leave, and invest in infrastructure that would be more conducive to combining parenthood and an active lifestyle.

Another thing Belarus in particular should consider is reducing the length of maternity leave. After the fall of the USSR, our country introduced a three-year maternity leave, which is currently the longest paid maternity leave in the world. Formally, no one is forcing mothers to sit at home with the kid this whole time. But in practice, most women are pressured into taking all three years. There are two main reasons for this:

Such legislation creates confusion, as it implies that this three-year period is somehow vital for the child’s development. And women who go back to work after only a year of maternity leave can sometimes face social stigma for being ‘bad mothers.’ However, there is no scientific evidence for a three-year maternity leave; it may seem hard to believe, but this number is totally made up. It is not clear whether children whose mothers returned from maternity leave before the three allotted years are any different from kids whose mothers took a full leave.

Long-term maternity leave creates a self-perpetuating cycle: since women choose to stay by their kids’ side until they turn three, the government does not invest in daycare or preschools, meaning that other women have no choice but to follow the majority.

In addition to supporting parenthood, there is one more effective way to increase the population: attracting migrants to the country. This brings us to our second point.

It is worth noting that Belarus has never taken any measures to counteract emigration or increase immigration at the government level. Since 2020, according to BEROC estimates (the research is soon to be published), around 150,000–250,000 people have left the country. Although there has always been a steady stream of emigration, before it was much smaller.

Meanwhile, if a foreigner wishes to move to Belarus, they are met with numerous bureaucratic obstacles, which require considerable efforts to overcome. The only exception here is the High Tech Park, which has managed to negotiate simplified conditions for its foreign residents.

However, it is safe to assume that the lack of migrants on the streets of Belarusian cities is not only due to the government’s best efforts to restrict everything. There is another reason, which is rarely spoken about in society: Belarusians are not a tolerant people, even if they sincerely love to call themselves so. According to available opinion polls, our fellow citizens are wary of different cultures.

What can be done?

The most important thing is not to panic. Most developed countries are facing the same problem: natural ageing and population decline are occurring throughout all of Europe. To some extent, this is a normal process: a decline in the birth rate is a side effect of improved quality of life, particularly for women. Nevertheless, Belarus and Belarusians ought to take several important steps in order to mitigate population loss.

First, the country should support childbearing. Existing measures to support motherhood in Belarus focus on the poor; however, little attention is devoted to the problems of modern working women, for whom the main obstacle to raising a family is their career. Such Belarusians and their partners are not poor in money terms—they just don’t have enough time. Therefore, their time is what ought to be subsidised.

To this end, the state could make efforts to build a convenient daycare system where children can be sent at earlier ages. It could also introduce legislation that offers more flexible employment terms for young parents, promote paternal leave, and invest in infrastructure that would be more conducive to combining parenthood and an active lifestyle.

Another thing Belarus in particular should consider is reducing the length of maternity leave. After the fall of the USSR, our country introduced a three-year maternity leave, which is currently the longest paid maternity leave in the world. Formally, no one is forcing mothers to sit at home with the kid this whole time. But in practice, most women are pressured into taking all three years. There are two main reasons for this:

Such legislation creates confusion, as it implies that this three-year period is somehow vital for the child’s development. And women who go back to work after only a year of maternity leave can sometimes face social stigma for being ‘bad mothers.’ However, there is no scientific evidence for a three-year maternity leave; it may seem hard to believe, but this number is totally made up. It is not clear whether children whose mothers returned from maternity leave before the three allotted years are any different from kids whose mothers took a full leave.

Long-term maternity leave creates a self-perpetuating cycle: since women choose to stay by their kids’ side until they turn three, the government does not invest in daycare or preschools, meaning that other women have no choice but to follow the majority.

In addition to supporting parenthood, there is one more effective way to increase the population: attracting migrants to the country. This brings us to our second point.

It is worth noting that Belarus has never taken any measures to counteract emigration or increase immigration at the government level. Since 2020, according to BEROC estimates (the research is soon to be published), around 150,000–250,000 people have left the country. Although there has always been a steady stream of emigration, before it was much smaller.

Meanwhile, if a foreigner wishes to move to Belarus, they are met with numerous bureaucratic obstacles, which require considerable efforts to overcome. The only exception here is the High Tech Park, which has managed to negotiate simplified conditions for its foreign residents.

However, it is safe to assume that the lack of migrants on the streets of Belarusian cities is not only due to the government’s best efforts to restrict everything. There is another reason, which is rarely spoken about in society: Belarusians are not a tolerant people, even if they sincerely love to call themselves so. According to available opinion polls, our fellow citizens are wary of different cultures.

In place of a conclusion

There are many aspects to a nation: political, cultural, geographic, physical, etc. But unfortunately, the situation is worrying on all these fronts. In the end, whether there will be 20 million Belarusians by the end of the century or only four million depends on our choices in the coming years. Emigration, childbirth, and attitudes towards foreign cultures are all factors that influence the ultimate outcome, but at the moment, trends are not optimistic. While the government controls many aspects of life in Belarus (quality of life in the country, family policy, childcare availability, barriers to immigration), we still have control over others.

In place of a conclusion

There are many aspects to a nation: political, cultural, geographic, physical, etc. But unfortunately, the situation is worrying on all these fronts. In the end, whether there will be 20 million Belarusians by the end of the century or only four million depends on our choices in the coming years. Emigration, childbirth, and attitudes towards foreign cultures are all factors that influence the ultimate outcome, but at the moment, trends are not optimistic. While the government controls many aspects of life in Belarus (quality of life in the country, family policy, childcare availability, barriers to immigration), we still have control over others.

In place of a conclusion

There are many aspects to a nation: political, cultural, geographic, physical, etc. But unfortunately, the situation is worrying on all these fronts. In the end, whether there will be 20 million Belarusians by the end of the century or only four million depends on our choices in the coming years. Emigration, childbirth, and attitudes towards foreign cultures are all factors that influence the ultimate outcome, but at the moment, trends are not optimistic. While the government controls many aspects of life in Belarus (quality of life in the country, family policy, childcare availability, barriers to immigration), we still have control over others.

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