How to Prevent a New Authoritarianism After Lukashenka

how to prevent a new authoritarianism after Lukashenka

Ryhor Astapenia

February 2023

One year ago, Aleksander Lukashenka held a referendum on constitutional amendments that further cemented authoritarianism in Belarus. In the future, our country will need to dismantle this system. This will mean deciding what initial changes to the fundamental law of the country are most needed in order to build a fair and sustainable political system. Ryhor Astapenia discusses what to prioritize.

Ryhor Astapenia

Ryhor Astapenia is the Founder of the Center for New Ideas and serves as the director of the Belarus Initiative at Chatham House. He obtained his PhD from the University of Warsaw.

Last year’s referendum seemed senseless to many Belarusians, so it’s probably worth recapping what it was about. The Lukashenka regime promised a new constitution amidst the protests of 2020, but rather than liberalization, the main change proposed was the strengthening of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly—a sort of “collective Lukashenka.” In short, the government is trying its hand at party building, which will only be accessible to organizations that are loyal to the current regime, like “Belaya Rus.”

Ostensibly, these innovations are supposed to move Belarus towards representative democracy, although the country continues to place near the bottom of the list in international rankings for such. In a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Belarus placed 153rd out of 167 countries.

It’s obvious that the current personalist regime is aiming to strengthen its positions and ensure a controlled transit of power. In his “retirement,” Lukashenka could become the head of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly and continue to control a new and acquiescent president from there (he could combine both positions initially).

Research has shown that political parties can help autocrats bring elites together and monitor their actions—this is one reason United Russia was created. Some also believe that the government’s efforts to create a party are part of a transition to an even more totalitarian system, where citizens would be expected to display their loyalty to the government through membership to mass organizations.

The chance of such a system surviving is a topic for another article. In this one, I would like to focus on what should change in the Constitution after a regime change in order to guarantee the survival of democracy into its next stage of infancy. This topic may seem academic, but it is too important to ignore. Most probably, Belarusians did not fully understand how important a constitution is for a country when they voted in the 1996 referendum, and the consequences of this are evident now. In any case, change is inevitable—the only question is when it will come.

What changes does the Belarusian Constitution really need?

First, changes to the fundamental law should be instituted openly—this is the only way for them to be legitimate. Propagandists insist that the amendments voted on in the last referendum were discussed by groups of concerned citizens. But it’s obvious that the government was not particularly interested in public opinion.

One way to adopt a new Constitution would be to convene a special assembly following open elections. Likewise, the Constitution could be drafted by a new and democratically elected parliament. In both these scenarios, there is still a risk that if any one side gets barely enough votes to form a majority, it will immediately rewrite the Constitution to fit its own interests. One solution to this problem could be laws stipulating a super-majority to pass a new Constitution. In any case, the ultimate decision on any amendments should be based on the results of a national referendum.

Second, Belarusians should not delude themselves into thinking that a transition to parliamentarianism would automatically lead to democracy. Although this type of political system may seem like the most European and democratic option, it doesn’t guarantee fairness and stability. Prime ministers in parliamentary republics have broad powers that they can abuse when their party receives an elected majority. Such a development is likely when a country lacks democratic traditions. One example is Hungary, which has ceased to be a full-fledged democracy.

In fact, politicians in the post-Soviet space have used a transition to parliamentarianism as a means of holding on to personal power: after serving two terms, presidents in Georgia and Armenia have attempted to reinvent themselves as prime ministers in order to further strengthen their grip on power.

Rather than a parliamentary republic, one more sensible model might feature a strong president AND prime minister; this is especially important if one of these institutions is vulnerable to foreign interference. The political system would thus have at least two centers keeping each other in check, preventing the other from shoring up too much power. For example, after the revolutions in the mid-2000s, Ukraine rewrote its constitution and chose a presidential model (with a strong prime minister). This strengthened systemic political competition.

Belarus could also opt for the American model, where presidential power is kept in check by congress, which the head of state cannot dissolve. This is one of the foundations of the famous “system of checks and balances” that has preserved democracy in the US for more than two centuries now.

Third, in order to avoid a concentration of power in the hands of one person, Belarus needs more local government. Governors and mayors should be elected positions, and their powers, as well as the role of local parliaments—should be significantly expanded. Democratic and economically successful societies cannot grow without grassroots initiatives.

Fourth, given the significance of propaganda in all authoritarian regimes, the independence of the media must be guaranteed. This could be accomplished by appointing a commission with broad powers composed of representatives of various media outlets. Its mission would be to ensure that journalists are not subject to pressure.

Finally, the key provisions of the democratic constitution must be protected from frequent rewriting: the processes for holding elections or choosing judges should not be easy to change. One option would be to require amendments to these articles to obtain the consent of an absolute majority in parliament and subsequently be approved via referendum. Viktor Orbán and his Fidezs party were able to usurp power in Hungary thanks largely to how easy it was to amend the constitution in parliament.

What will become of our Constitution after Lukashenka’s departure is, of course, an open question. But Belarus is hardly the first country that will have had to rewrite its Constitution for the sake of democratic change. The key is to avoid repeating our own mistakes, as well as those of others. And most importantly, we must ensure that the Constitution is respected, which is our biggest problem today.

What changes does the Belarusian Constitution really need?

First, changes to the fundamental law should be instituted openly—this is the only way for them to be legitimate. Propagandists insist that the amendments voted on in the last referendum were discussed by groups of concerned citizens. But it’s obvious that the government was not particularly interested in public opinion.

One way to adopt a new Constitution would be to convene a special assembly following open elections. Likewise, the Constitution could be drafted by a new and democratically elected parliament. In both these scenarios, there is still a risk that if any one side gets barely enough votes to form a majority, it will immediately rewrite the Constitution to fit its own interests. One solution to this problem could be laws stipulating a super-majority to pass a new Constitution. In any case, the ultimate decision on any amendments should be based on the results of a national referendum.

Second, Belarusians should not delude themselves into thinking that a transition to parliamentarianism would automatically lead to democracy. Although this type of political system may seem like the most European and democratic option, it doesn’t guarantee fairness and stability. Prime ministers in parliamentary republics have broad powers that they can abuse when their party receives an elected majority. Such a development is likely when a country lacks democratic traditions. One example is Hungary, which has ceased to be a full-fledged democracy.

In fact, politicians in the post-Soviet space have used a transition to parliamentarianism as a means of holding on to personal power: after serving two terms, presidents in Georgia and Armenia have attempted to reinvent themselves as prime ministers in order to further strengthen their grip on power.

Rather than a parliamentary republic, one more sensible model might feature a strong president AND prime minister; this is especially important if one of these institutions is vulnerable to foreign interference. The political system would thus have at least two centers keeping each other in check, preventing the other from shoring up too much power. For example, after the revolutions in the mid-2000s, Ukraine rewrote its constitution and chose a presidential model (with a strong prime minister). This strengthened systemic political competition.

Belarus could also opt for the American model, where presidential power is kept in check by congress, which the head of state cannot dissolve. This is one of the foundations of the famous “system of checks and balances” that has preserved democracy in the US for more than two centuries now.

Third, in order to avoid a concentration of power in the hands of one person, Belarus needs more local government. Governors and mayors should be elected positions, and their powers, as well as the role of local parliaments—should be significantly expanded. Democratic and economically successful societies cannot grow without grassroots initiatives.

Fourth, given the significance of propaganda in all authoritarian regimes, the independence of the media must be guaranteed. This could be accomplished by appointing a commission with broad powers composed of representatives of various media outlets. Its mission would be to ensure that journalists are not subject to pressure.

Finally, the key provisions of the democratic constitution must be protected from frequent rewriting: the processes for holding elections or choosing judges should not be easy to change. One option would be to require amendments to these articles to obtain the consent of an absolute majority in parliament and subsequently be approved via referendum. Viktor Orbán and his Fidezs party were able to usurp power in Hungary thanks largely to how easy it was to amend the constitution in parliament.

What will become of our Constitution after Lukashenka’s departure is, of course, an open question. But Belarus is hardly the first country that will have had to rewrite its Constitution for the sake of democratic change. The key is to avoid repeating our own mistakes, as well as those of others. And most importantly, we must ensure that the Constitution is respected, which is our biggest problem today.

What changes does the Belarusian Constitution really need?

First, changes to the fundamental law should be instituted openly—this is the only way for them to be legitimate. Propagandists insist that the amendments voted on in the last referendum were discussed by groups of concerned citizens. But it’s obvious that the government was not particularly interested in public opinion.

One way to adopt a new Constitution would be to convene a special assembly following open elections. Likewise, the Constitution could be drafted by a new and democratically elected parliament. In both these scenarios, there is still a risk that if any one side gets barely enough votes to form a majority, it will immediately rewrite the Constitution to fit its own interests. One solution to this problem could be laws stipulating a super-majority to pass a new Constitution. In any case, the ultimate decision on any amendments should be based on the results of a national referendum.

Second, Belarusians should not delude themselves into thinking that a transition to parliamentarianism would automatically lead to democracy. Although this type of political system may seem like the most European and democratic option, it doesn’t guarantee fairness and stability. Prime ministers in parliamentary republics have broad powers that they can abuse when their party receives an elected majority. Such a development is likely when a country lacks democratic traditions. One example is Hungary, which has ceased to be a full-fledged democracy.

In fact, politicians in the post-Soviet space have used a transition to parliamentarianism as a means of holding on to personal power: after serving two terms, presidents in Georgia and Armenia have attempted to reinvent themselves as prime ministers in order to further strengthen their grip on power.

Rather than a parliamentary republic, one more sensible model might feature a strong president AND prime minister; this is especially important if one of these institutions is vulnerable to foreign interference. The political system would thus have at least two centers keeping each other in check, preventing the other from shoring up too much power. For example, after the revolutions in the mid-2000s, Ukraine rewrote its constitution and chose a presidential model (with a strong prime minister). This strengthened systemic political competition.

Belarus could also opt for the American model, where presidential power is kept in check by congress, which the head of state cannot dissolve. This is one of the foundations of the famous “system of checks and balances” that has preserved democracy in the US for more than two centuries now.

Third, in order to avoid a concentration of power in the hands of one person, Belarus needs more local government. Governors and mayors should be elected positions, and their powers, as well as the role of local parliaments—should be significantly expanded. Democratic and economically successful societies cannot grow without grassroots initiatives.

Fourth, given the significance of propaganda in all authoritarian regimes, the independence of the media must be guaranteed. This could be accomplished by appointing a commission with broad powers composed of representatives of various media outlets. Its mission would be to ensure that journalists are not subject to pressure.

Finally, the key provisions of the democratic constitution must be protected from frequent rewriting: the processes for holding elections or choosing judges should not be easy to change. One option would be to require amendments to these articles to obtain the consent of an absolute majority in parliament and subsequently be approved via referendum. Viktor Orbán and his Fidezs party were able to usurp power in Hungary thanks largely to how easy it was to amend the constitution in parliament.

What will become of our Constitution after Lukashenka’s departure is, of course, an open question. But Belarus is hardly the first country that will have had to rewrite its Constitution for the sake of democratic change. The key is to avoid repeating our own mistakes, as well as those of others. And most importantly, we must ensure that the Constitution is respected, which is our biggest problem today.

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